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Managerial Foreign Experience and Outward Foreign Direct Investment:  
Evidence from China 
 
Abstract 
Using hand-collected data from Chinese public companies, we examine whether 
managerial foreign experience affects corporate outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) decision. Our result shows that there is a positive association between 
managerial foreign experience and OFDI. The finding is robust to alternative sampling 
method, foreign experience measures, and regression specification. We also use the 
instrumental variable approach, the propensity score matching procedure, and the 
Heckman two-stage selection model to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. 
While both foreign work and study experience promote OFDI, the effect is significant 
only in non-state-owned entities and only when returnee managers hold senior 
positions. Lastly, we show that managerial foreign experience is associated with 
improved performance of outward investments. 
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Managerial Foreign Experience and Outward Foreign Direct Investment:  
Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent development of globalization has been characterized by the rapid growth of outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging economies (e.g., Buckley et al., 2018; Lu et 
al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012; Shi et al., 2017; Gaur et al., 2018). It has long been recognized 
that OFDI is a key developing strategy for both firms and countries. Firms invest abroad to 
seek market access, acquire strategic assets (e.g., Buckley et al., 2009; Deng, 2009), and to 
avoid home country regulation or resource distortions (Chen et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2017). 
Countries utilize OFDI to optimize industrial structure (Mock et al., 2008) and promote home 
country innovation (Li et al., 2016). Current research examining the determinants of outward 
investment from emerging economies mainly focuses on macro-economic environments such 
as market demand, host and home country institutional and cultural differences (e.g., Lu et al., 
2014; Wang et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2017; Kang and Jiang, 2012). However, very few studies 
emphasize the role of firm characteristics1 and none systematically analyzes how managerial 
foreign experience is associated with corporate OFDI decisions. Our study attempts to fill this 
void. 
China, as the largest emerging economy, has been significantly and consistently increasing 
its OFDI in the last several decades along with its economic reform and globalization. 
According to the recent report published by United Nations Conference on Trade and 
                                                
1 Wang et al. (2012), as an exception, includes several firm level factors as control variables in their empirical specifications. 
However, there is no studies providing consistent and statistically significant effect on firm outward investment.  
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Development (UNCTAD), China was ranked second in year 2016 based on total amount of 
OFDI, only after the United States.2 
Along with the rapid growth in OFDI, the Chinese government also initiated a series of 
policies aiming to attract talents with foreign experience. In particular, the famous “Thousand 
Talents Plan”3 was implemented by the Central government in 2008, followed by various 
pecuniary incentives and housing subsidies provided by the local governments. While existing 
literature on the impacts of returnee’s foreign experience suggests positive benefits to firm 
performance when talents join corporate boards (Giannetti et al., 2015), it is mute on whether 
these returnees can influence OFDI decisions when becoming executives. In addition, how 
knowledge gained abroad by managers is transformed into firm value is largely overlooked. 
Thus, it is important to understand whether managerial foreign experience can effectively 
promote firms’ OFDI, which can provide implications to policy makers. 
Several studies exploring the effects of individual’s foreign experience focus on foreign 
board members in developed countries (e.g., Masulis et al., 2012; Piekkari et al., 2015). These 
studies suggest negative impacts due to lower participation rates of corporate boards and 
language barriers. Unlike evidence from developed countries, returnees in emerging markets 
usually gain their foreign experience from countries with well protected legal and business 
backgrounds (Yuan and Wen, 2018). They obtain advanced technology and managerial 
expertise, are equipped with international vision and network, and some even possess 
                                                
2 https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2018_en.pdf 
3 On December 2008, the Chinese government launched the “Thousand Talents Plan”, aiming to recruit experts 
with overseas working and studying experience who are willing to work in China on a full-time basis. Please see 
more information at http://www.1000plan.org.cn/en/. 
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intellectual property. Thus, for emerging economies, it is possible that bringing these talents 
back can benefit the hiring firms.  
To examine the effect of managerial foreign experience on corporate OFDI, we first hand-
collect managerial foreign experience information from 2001 to 2015. Then we merge it with 
firm foreign investment dataset obtained from the Chinese Research Data Services (CNRDS). 
Our sample consists of 23,146 firm-year observations from 2,552 unique firms. Our 
multivariate OLS regression results show that foreign experience of managers is positively 
associated with outward foreign direct investment. That is, firms with returnee managers are 
more likely to participate in foreign investment, with higher frequency and larger values of 
investment. The impact is more pronounced when the number and percentage of managers with 
foreign experience is higher. The result is robust to alternative sampling that excludes managers 
with only Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan experience, to alternative measures of foreign 
experience, and to alternative non-linear regression models (Logit and Tobit).   
Concerning a company’s decision of hiring managers with foreign experience is not 
random and can be correlated to certain unobservable firm characteristics, we perform several 
robustness tests to mitigate the potential endogeneity issue. The results show that the positive 
association remains robust using the instrumental variable approach and the propensity score 
matching (PSM) approach. We also use the Heckman two-stage selection model to control for 
self-selection bias and the result continues to hold. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the 
effect is significant only in non-state-owned entities (non-SOEs), and only when returnee 
managers hold senior positions (CEOs and vice-CEOs). In addition, we find that both 
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managerial foreign work experience and study experience can promote OFDI. Lastly, we show 
that managerial foreign experience is associated with improved performance of outward 
investments. 
Our study contributes to the literature in at least two ways. First, it emphasizes the role of 
managerial international experience as a determinant of outward investments. Although OFDI 
from emerging economies has attracted numerous research, most of them emphasize the quality 
of home or host country institutions, industrial environments and other macro-economic 
conditions (see Shi et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012; Buckley et al., 2009; Lu et al., 2014). Little 
evidence is available about firm heterogeneity and how it relates to outward investment. Our 
paper addresses the association between managerial foreign experience and corporate OFDI. 
We find that managerial international experience, in particular, could facilitate the decision and 
performance of outward investments. Second, our study enriches the literature on the economic 
impacts of individual foreign experience. Prior research mainly examines how returnee 
contributes to innovation and firm performance through knowledge spillover channels (e.g., 
Liu et al., 2010; Li et al., 2012). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
systematically examine the effects of managerial foreign experience on firm outward FDI. The 
hand-collected data allows us to classify individual foreign experience by country and further 
examine how institutional and cultural differences lead to heterogeneous effects. 
 
2. Literature and hypothesis development 
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2.1. Literature 
Our study builds on two streams of literature. The first stream, emerging recently, is about 
the impact of managerial foreign experience on firms. Globalization over the last several 
decades witnesses the increasing likelihood of having foreign managers or directors joining 
firms. Masulis et al. (2012) find that while foreign independent directors can help mitigate 
cultural barriers in cross-border M&As and provide better consultation, they attend less board 
meetings and their firms are more likely to have financial restatements and bad earnings 
performances. The findings suggest that the better advisory role played by foreign directors 
comes at the cost of weakened monitoring role. Piekkari et al. (2015) focus on the change in 
working language due to board diversity in nationality and find that the use of English as 
working language after the join of foreign directors creates a barrier for local non-English 
speaking directors to effectively express their opinion, which adversely affects corporate 
governance.  
For emerging countries, the impact of returnee managers from developed countries might 
be more pronounced as they possess advanced knowledge and superior management. Recent 
studies using Chinese data document the positive impacts. For example, Giannetti et al. (2015) 
find that directors’ foreign experience can help improve firms’ operating performance as they 
bring world-class management practice, facilitate cross-country M&As and financing with 
their resources, and devote themselves more to corporate governance instead of pleasing 
government officials or extracting rent from government. Yuan and Wen (2018) show that 
managers’ experience gained from foreign countries can promote the adoption of new 
technology in their companies, and can have positive effect on corporate innovation. Dai et al. 
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(2018) find that managers’ foreign experience can help improve firms’ investment efficiency, 
especially for the firms that experience over-investment. In terms of firms’ strategic 
development, Xu and Sun (2017) find that CEOs’ foreign experience can help lower transaction 
cost and promote technology diffusion, which improves their firms’ export and product quality. 
Finally, Wen and Song (2017) show that managerial foreign experience is positively related to 
their firms’ CSR performance. 
This study is also related to the literature on outward investment decisions of emerging 
economies. Comprehensive investigations of OFDI determinants have been carried out mainly 
at the country level. A number of factors such as market seeking, strategic asset acquiring, 
institutional risk avoidance and etc., are demonstrated to affect the location choice and 
performance of outward foreign investments from developing economies (e.g., Buckley et al., 
2018; Gaur et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2012; Kang and Jiang, 2012). Recent 
studies on OFDI from developing countries draw on firm level information to show that 
manufacturers with outward investment are more productive and profitable (e.g., Tian et al., 
2016; Huang and Zhang, 2017). Beside macro-economic conditions and institution qualities, 
firm-specific characteristics such as ownership begin to enter the analysis of firm OFDI 
decisions (e.g., Hu and Cui, 2014; Huang et al., 2017). For instance, Wang et al. (2012) suggests 
firm specific idiosyncrasies such as sales, employment, and age, could drive outward FDI of 
Chinese firms. Furthermore, Wei et al. (2014) found that productivity, technology-based 
capability and export experience affect firm outward investments. But the role of managers 
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who participate in and directly execute corporate investment projects, has not been fully 
considered and explored. 
2.2 Hypothesis development 
Building on the upper echelon theory, we now discuss how returnee managers might affect 
corporate OFDI from three aspects: knowledge advantage, international experience, and cross-
cultural communication skills. First, returnee managers tend to have better understanding of 
OFDI with their inimitable knowledge, which can positively influence their firms’ global 
strategy and investment. Hambrick and Mason (1984) point out the importance of managers’ 
knowledge base to firms’ strategic choice, and such knowledge is largely built on their formal 
education and work experience. It has been documented that most returnee managers pursued 
higher education overseas (Guo et al., 2009; Zhang and Li, 2002). They represent a key source 
of knowledge due to their knowledge acquired aboard. When they are hired, they are more 
likely to facilitate knowledge transfer and information exchange, which influences their firms’ 
cross-border investment (Docquier and Lodigiani, 2010). Returnees can also help lower 
information asymmetry when their companies enter into foreign markets for investment 
opportunities and help reduce the uncertainty and risks with overseas investment (Wang, 2007). 
A few studies provide evidence consistent with international knowledge diffusion through 
returnee managers (Filatotchev et al., 2011; Jean et al., 2011; Malchow-Møller et al., 2011; 
Markusen and Trofimenko, 2009). Saxenian (2006) also suggests that returnee managers with 
extensive knowledge may help to promote Chinese OFDI as they can identify foreign 
market/investment opportunities and find foreign business partners. Prior studies do find that 
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management team’s knowledge about foreign markets enables their firms to increase their 
investments in foreign markets (Eriksson et al., 1997). In sum, returnee managers’ cognitive 
advantage in outward investment can promote OFDI. 
Second, returnee managers’ foreign (or international) experience can help their firms to 
formulate and implement international strategies, especially in terms of OFDI. Many Chinese 
companies face obstacles when they explore foreign markets and overseas operations because 
their management teams do not understand foreign institutions, such as media relation, trade 
unions, or competition law (Cui et al., 2014). Returnee managers’ international experience can 
alleviate this problem. Prior studies find that top management team’s foreign experience is 
positively associated with firms’ international diversification and international performance 
(Sambharya, 1996; Athanassiou and Nigh, 2000; Tihanyi et al., 2005; Lee and Park, 2006). 
Adler and Bartholomew (1992) point out that the success of any international strategy is highly 
depending on the manager’s competence in dealing with transnational business. Such skills can 
only be obtained through significant international assignments. Many of returnee managers 
obtained such experience in multinational companies. The knowledge-based view also 
suggests that managerial foreign experience shapes corporate internationalization strategy 
(Filatotchev et al., 2009; Saxenian 2006). Other studies show that managerial international 
experience enables firms to increase their investment in foreign markets (Eriksson et al., 1997).  
Finally, returnee managers possess superior cross-cultural communication skills and social 
networks, which can help their firms deal with cultural differences and other obstacles in cross-
country investing activities. Institutional and cultural differences are major barriers for many 
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Chinese firms conducting OFDI (Johanson and Vahlne, 1997; Kang and Jiang, 2012). Using 
their personal experience, returnee managers can help bridge the cultural gap, which can lower 
risks, uncertainties, and transaction costs associated with OFDI (Rabbiosi and Stucchi, 2012). 
It has also been documented that many returnee managers have developed their professional 
and social networks aboard, which can help their firms’ overseas management (Cui and Jiang, 
2012; Wang et al., 2012). For example, these networks can facilitate their access of information 
relevant to their firms’ foreign investment (Athanassiou and Nigh, 2000). The networks they 
developed can also improve coordination and cooperation both inter-firm and intra-firm (Daily 
et al., 2000).  
Based on our discussion above, we hypothesize the following
H: Ceteris paribus, firms with returnee managers are associated with higher probability of 
OFDI and larger OFDI amounts. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all Chinese public companies listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) from 2001 through 2015. We start 
from 2001 since most listed companies started to disclose managers’ bios and background 
information from that year. We hand-collect managers’ foreign experience data from their 
companies’ annual reports. Specifically, we read and screen the biography to determine whether 
managers have foreign study or work experience. We also verify and supplement the data with 
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information from public media.4 Following prior literature (e.g., Giannetti et al., 2015), we 
consider a manager having foreign experience if he or she studied or worked outside (mainland) 
China. To further ensure that foreign experience captures managers’ actual exposure to a 
foreign environment, we exclude the situations in which they only worked for an overseas 
branch of a Chinese company or a Chinese branch of a foreign company or a Sino-foreign joint 
venture to obtain managerial foreign working experience. We also record the countries or 
regions where these returnee managers obtained their foreign experience, whether they have 
study or work experience, their academic degrees in foreign countries, as well as their job 
positions in listed companies.  
Corporate OFDI data are obtained from Chinese Research Data Services Platform 
(CNRDS). We match the OFDI investor companies with Chinese A-share listed companies. 
We download other financial and corporate governance data from China Stock Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. All the data are cross-checked for consistency. 
Following the literature, we exclude firms in financial industry (e.g., banks, insurance 
companies, and investment trusts) from our sample since they are heavily regulated and their 
financial statement structures are quite different from other companies. We also drop 
observations without enough information to calculate the regression variables. After imposing 
these requirements, we end up with a sample of 23,146 firm-year observations from 2,552 
unique firms.  
Table 1 Panel A presents sample distributions by year. We can clearly observe that the 
                                                
4  We use public media such as Baidu (https://baike.baidu.com/), Sina (https://finance.sina.com.cn), Ifeng 
(http://finance.ifeng.com/), and Hexun (http://renwu.hexun.com/) to verify managerial foreign experience data. 
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number (percentage) of firms hiring returnee managers steadily grows through the sample 
period, from 83 (8.78%) in year 2001 to 468 (19.48%) in year 2015. The trend is consistent 
with previous findings (e.g., Morck et al., 2008). In addition, the number (percentage) of firms 
initiating OFDI also increases from 5 (0.53%) in year 2001 to 153 (6.37%) in year 2015. The 
growth of OFDI among Chinese public firms is also consistent with previous findings (e.g., Li 
et al., 2016).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We then separate the sample into two subgroups: firms with returnee managers and firms 
without returnee managers, and examine the percentage of firms initiating OFDI for these two 
subgroups separately. The results are reported in the last two columns in Panel A. The 
percentage of initiating OFDI in firms with returnee managers (percentage1) is greater than 
that in firms without returnee managers (percentage2) in most years, which suggests that 
returnee managers have a positive impact on OFDI and provides preliminary support to our 
hypothesis. To visualize the effect, we plot the percentages of firms initiating OFDI for these 
two subsamples in Figure 1.  
Table 1 Panel B reports sample composition by industry. The industry classification is 
based on the 2012 China Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) industry classification. 
Consistent with prior literature, most of our sample observations (62.82% = 14,542/23,146) 
comes from manufacturing industry. The top three industries with most returnee managers are 
Health and social work (44.44%), Information and technology (29.07%), and Scientific 
research and technical services (26.47%). The top three industries in terms of initiating OFDI 
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are Health and social work (11.11%), Construction (10.02%), and Mining (7.22%). 
3.2. Regression model and variables 
We employ the following multivariate model to test our hypotheses. To mitigate the 
potential endogeneity issue, we regress the contemporaneous OFDI measures on the lagged 
managerial foreign experience variable and other control variables. The basic OLS empirical 
model is as follows: 
OFDI i,t a0+ a1 Overseas i,t-1 + a2 Top1i,t-1 + a3 Independence i,t-1+ a4 Managerial 
ownership i,t-1 + a5 Firm size i,t-1 + a6 Leverage i,t-1 + a7 ROA i,t-1 + a8 Sales 
growth i,t-1 + a9 Asset turnover i,t-1 + a10 Firm age i,t-1 + ∑Industry + ∑Year + ε                                             
(1) 
The dependent variable OFDI is our proxy for outward foreign direct investment. We 
employ two different measures to capture the existence and the extent of OFDI: (1) OFDI (0/1) 
is a dummy variable, which equals one if a firm initiates at least one outward foreign direct 
investment, and zero otherwise,5 and (2) OFDI amount measures the logarithm of the total 
amount of OFDI a firm initiates in a year.  
Our independent variable is managers with overseas experience (Overseas). Following 
prior literature (e.g. Giannetti et al., 2015; Yuan and Wen, 2018), we use two variables to 
capture managers’ foreign experience. The first one is Overseas dummy, which equals one if a 
firm has at least one returnee manager, and zero otherwise. The second measure is Overseas 
number, which represents the total number of returnee managers a firm has.6 According to our 
                                                
5 For robustness, we also run Logit regression when we use the indicator variable as our dependent variable. The 
result is similar. 
6 In the robustness test, we also scale this number by the total number of managers in a firm and the results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on Overseas to be positive, consistent with managerial 
foreign experience having a positive impact on OFDI. 
Following prior literature (e.g., Hu and Cui, 2014; Huang et al., 2017; Quer et al., 2012; 
Wang et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2014), we control for several firm-level characteristics that are 
suggested to affect the likelihood of companies’ OFDI decisions. These control variables 
include the share percentage of the largest shareholder (Top1), board independence 
(Independence), the percentage of managers’ share holdings (Managerial ownership), leverage 
(Leverage), profitability (ROA), growth opportunity (Sales growth), operating capacity (Asset 
turnover), and the number of years a firm operated (Firm age). We also add industry and year 
dummies to control for the industrial fixed effect and macroeconomic environment changes. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. Detailed variable definitions are in the Appendix.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A presents descriptive statistics. To mitigate the undue influence of outliers, 
we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% tails. The mean of OFDI (0/1) is 
0.025, suggesting that about 2.5 percentage of sample observations conducted OFDI during 
our sample period. In terms of the amount of OFDI investment (OFDI amount), the mean is 
0.515, which corresponds to 17.246 billion RMB.  
Regarding managerial foreign experience, the mean of overseas dummy is 0.155, 
indicating that 15.5 percent of observation has at least one returnee manager during the sample 
period. The mean number of returnee managers (0.217), however, is relatively low, suggesting 
the overall scarce of managers with foreign experience. The mean value of Overseas CEO is 
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0.049, indicating that only 4.9 percent of CEOs has overseas experience. The means of 
Overseas work dummy and Overseas study dummy are 0.065 and 0.132, respectively, revealing 
that 6.5% of managers obtained overseas work experience while 13.2% of them gained 
overseas study experience. Finally, the mean of Overseas senior and Overseas junior are 0.131 
and 0.036, respectively, which suggests that returnee managers are more likely to take 
executive-level positions in companies. For brevity, we do not discuss the statistics of other 
control variables which are largely consistent with prior studies (e.g., Hu and Cui, 2014; Huang 
et al., 2017; Quer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports Pearson (below) and Spearman (above) correlations, which 
show that all measures of corporate OFDI are significantly and positively related to managerial 
foreign experience. Nevertheless, we compute variance inflation factor (VIF) for control 
variables and find the value is very low, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem in our study. The univariate testing results, reported in Panel C, also confirm that the 
levels of OFDI (measured by both the existence and the amount of OFDI) in firms with returnee 
managers are higher than that of firms without returnee managers, and the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Thus, both correlation and univariate test provide 
preliminary support to our hypothesis. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Multivariate regression results 
We report the results of multivariate regression in Table 3. When we measure OFDI with 
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an indicator variable (columns 1 and 2), we find that the coefficient on Overseas dummy is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (0.012, t = 2.71, in column 1). The 
magnitude is also economically significant. The coefficient suggests that hiring at least one 
returnee manager is associated with 1.2 percent increase in the probability of OFDI, which is 
important given the overall probability of OFDI (the mean) is only 2.5 percent for the whole 
sample. We obtain similar but statistically weaker result when we measure foreign experience 
using overseas number (column 2). We also use the amount of OFDI (columns 3 and 4) as our 
dependent variables to run the model. The results continue to be positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficients on control variables are in general consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Hu and Cui, 2014; Huang et al., 2017; Quer et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). For example, 
OFDI is positively associated with firm size, profitability, and sales growth. Overall, the results 
demonstrate that managerial foreign experience is positively related to OFDI. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2. Alternative sampling, measure, and regression specification 
We include mangers who obtained their experience in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in 
our benchmark results. The rationale underlying this research choice is that business 
management in these areas has been heavily influenced by Western countries in the last several 
decades. To make sure that our results are not solely driven by managers from these areas, we 
remove these managers and rerun the regression model as a robustness check. Table 4 Panel A 
reports the results. The coefficients on independent variables remain positive and statistically 
significant in five columns. More importantly, the magnitude of coefficients increases relative 
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to those reported in Table 3, suggesting that our results are not particularly due to those returnee 
managers who only obtained experience from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.   
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
The generalization of our results also critically hinges on the measure of managers’ foreign 
experience. To assure the robustness of our finding, we use two alternative measures, Overseas 
percentage and Overseas CEO, to rerun the regression model. Overseas percentage is the 
number of returnee managers divided by the total number of managers, which mitigates the 
potential problem that different companies may have different size of management teams. 
Overseas CEO is an indicator variable that equals one if a CEO has foreign experience, and 
zero otherwise, capturing CEO’s foreign experience solely. The results of using these two 
alternative measures are presented in Panel B of Table 4. The results remain to be statistically 
significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels. 
Since OFDI (0/1) is a dummy variable, we also use the non-linear Logit regression to re-
estimate our model. In addition, as OFDI amount is a truncated measure (greater or equal to 
zero), we use the Tobit model to estimate the model. Panel C of Table 4 reports the regression 
results using alternative model specifications. We find that Overseas dummy and Overseas 
number are still positively significant, which is consistent with our main results using OLS 
model. 
4.3. Addressing potential endogeneity concerns 
4.3.1. Using instrumental variable (IV) approach 
While we include many firm characteristics to control for the determinants of OFDI, we 
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may still suffer from omitted variable problem. To address this issue, we adopt the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. We use the mean ratio of Overseas dummy in the industry (excluding 
the firm itself) and the introduction of provincial talent policy as two instruments. Specifically, 
we first calculate Mean overseas of other firms within the same industry as the first instrument. 
Firms in the same industry have similar characteristics and face similar risks, the fact that other 
peer firms hire returnee managers may affect a firm’s hiring decision, but unlikely affects its 
OFDI decisions. We then follow Giannetti et al. (2015) and use the staggered introduction of 
talent retention policy in different provinces as the second instrument. For each firm-year 
observation, the variable Policy is set to 1 after the announcement of the policy in the province 
and 0 otherwise. Both instruments are expected to correlate with firms’ hiring decision, but not 
with firms’ OFDI. The test of over identification of IV suggests that they do not correlate with 
residuals, satisfying the requirement of good IVs. Panel A of Table 5 (left) reports the result of 
first stage regression, showing both IVs are positively and significantly related to the hiring of 
returnee managers. For the second stage, we use the predicted hiring of returnee manger as 
independent variables and reports the results in Panel B (right). The coefficients on the 
independent variable remain to be significantly positive at the 5 percent level. Thus, our 
findings are unlikely to be driven by omitted variable problem.   
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3.2. Using propensity score matched (PSM) sample 
Another potential concern for our finding is that treatment firms (i.e., firms hiring returnee 
managers) and control firms (i.e., firms without returnee managers) might differ significantly 
19 
 
from each other in many characteristics. While our regression model controls for those 
characteristics linearly, nonlinear effects that could not be controlled adequately may still drive 
our results. To alleviate this problem, we re-estimate our model using a propensity score 
matched sample. 
Following prior study (Yuan and Wen, 2018), we first regress our indicator variable (i.e., 
whether a firm has returnee managers) on a set of control variables, which includes all control 
variables in regression model (1), and estimate the propensity score that a firm hires a returnee 
manager. We then match each treatment firm with a control firm with the closest propensity. 
The matching is done with replacement, and the caliper is 0.01. Table 6 Panel A reports the 
covariate balance check result of PSM, suggesting that after matching treatment and control 
groups do not differ from each other significantly. Panel B reports the regression results using 
the matched sample. When we use Overseas dummy as independent variable, the results 
(columns 1 and 3) remain to be statistically significant and are largely consistent with those 
reported in Table 3. When the independent variable becomes Overseas number, the coefficients 
are still positive, but marginally insignificant (columns 2 and 4). This may be due to the reduced 
statistical power as our sample size also reduced significantly by about 70 percent. Overall, our 
analysis here suggests that our findings are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity introduced by 
nonlinearity. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.3.3. Controlling for self-selection 
While the PSM approach helps alleviate the nonlinearity problem, it does not mitigate the 
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self-selection bias. That is, a company’s decision of hiring managers with foreign experience 
is not random and can be correlated to certain unobservable firm characteristics.7 For instance, 
a company considering future OFDI might be more likely to hire returnee managers, and 
returnee managers are more likely to join such company if they sense such investment 
opportunities in the future. To account for this self-selection bias, we perform another 
robustness test with the Heckman selection model. 
Following Giannetti et al. (2015), we build a Probit selection model, and the dependent 
variable is Overseas dummy. We include those variables that might affect a company’s decision 
of hiring returnee managers in the model, such as state ownership, largest shareholder’s 
ownership, board size, board independence, firm age, firm size, leverage, ROA, and industry 
and year fixed effects. As Heckman approach requires an instrument variable (IV) that is 
correlated with the likelihood of hiring returnee managers, but not correlated with firm’s OFDI, 
we use the average percentage of hiring returnee managers in the same industry (Mean overseas) 
as the IV. We calculate Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) in the first stage Probit model and then 
include it into the second stage regression. 
Table 7 reports the results for this test. Panel A (left) shows the first-stage regression result. 
The coefficients on firm size and market-to-book are significantly positive, suggesting that 
large and growth companies are more likely to hire returnee mangers. On the other hand, we 
also find that state ownership, the largest shareholder ownership, and firm age are negatively 
related to the decision of hiring returnee managers. Panel B (right) reports the second-stage 
                                                
7 As those characteristics are unobservable, PSM approach could not address this problem. 
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regression result. The coefficients on Overseas number remain to be significantly positive at 
the 5 percent level for both dependent variables, OFDI (0/1) and OFDI amount. Thus, after 
controlling for potential self-selection bias, we still find a positive association between the 
hiring of returnee managers and the increase in OFDI. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
5. Further exploratory tests 
So far, we have provided empirical evidence that managerial foreign experience helps 
corporate OFDI. Next, we perform several extensions to explore the heterogeneity of the 
relation. 
5.1. The effect of state ownership 
We first investigate how state ownership might affect our main finding. On the one hand, 
it has been pointed out that China’s OFDI has been largely conducted by state-owned entities 
(SOEs) (Morck et al., 2008). Thus, one might expect the impact of managers with foreign 
experience on OFDI to be more pronounced in SOEs. However, drawing on resource 
dependence theory, Huang et al. (2017) argue and find some evidence that state ownership 
undermines SOEs’ willingness to conduct OFDI. Therefore, ex ante, it is unclear about the 
impact of state ownership on the relation. We partition our sample into two subgroups: SOEs 
vs. non-SOEs and run our regressions on them separately. The results are reported in Table 8 
Panel A. Interestingly, we find that the effect of managers’ foreign experience on OFDI 
actually concentrates in non-SOEs, suggesting that returnee managers play more important role 
in shaping OFDI decision in non-SOEs. 
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[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5.2. The effect of managerial position 
Next, we explore at which position these managers with foreign experience can play a role 
in OFDI decision. Generally, senior managers are more powerful and influential on firms’ 
decision-making. We predict that returnee managers at CEO and vice-CEO positions have more 
significant effect on OFDI. We hand-collect the information of managerial position. Following 
Yuan and Wen (2018), we construct the following model to test the effect of returnee managers’ 
position on OFDI: 
OFDI i,t β0+ β1 Overseas senior dummy (Overseas junior dummy) i,t-1 + ∑Control 
variables + ∑Industry + ∑Year + ε                                              (2) 
Overseas senior dummy is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if firm i has at least one 
returnee senior manager (at the position of CEO or vice-CEO). Overseas junior dummy is also 
a dummy variable. If firm i has at least one returnee junior manager (non-CEOs). We use these 
two variables as our independent variable and rerun model (1). The results are reported in Panel 
B of Table 8. For all three dependent variables, we can see that the effect of managers with 
foreign experience on OFDI is only significant when returnee managers take senior 
management positions, but not significant when they take junior level positions. Therefore, the 
result is consistent with our prediction that senior managers with foreign experience are more 
influential on OFDI than junior managers with foreign experience. 
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5.3. Overseas work experience vs. study experience 
Finally, we investigate whether foreign work experience and study experience have 
different effects on OFDI. We construct the following model to do this test: 
OFDI i,t β0+ β1 Overseas work dummy (Overseas study dummy) i,t-1 + ∑Control variables 
+ ∑Industry + ∑Year + ε                                                     (3) 
where, Overseas work (study) dummy is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if firm i has at 
least one manager with overseas work (study) experience in year t, and otherwise equals 0. 
Overseas study experience includes obtaining academic degrees (i.e., bachelor, master, and 
doctoral degrees), being visiting scholars and having post-doctoral experience in foreign 
countries.  
Table 8 panel C reports the regression results. The coefficients on Overseas work dummy 
and Overseas study dummy are both positively significant. The results indicate that overseas 
experience, both study experience and work experience, has important impacts on OFDI. 
5.4. Overseas revenue percentage 
The evidence we provide so far suggests that managerial foreign experience facilities their 
firms’ OFDI. These results, however, do not tell us whether OFDI leads to improved operating 
performance. Thus, in this section, we investigate whether returnee mangers help their firms 
generate more overseas revenue. To do so, we look at the percentage of overseas revenue in 
total revenue and regress it on managerial foreign experience variables. Table 9 reports the 
regression results. In column 1, we find that the coefficient on Overseas dummy is significantly 
positive (0.040, t = 4.63), suggesting that the existence of firm managers with foreign 
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experience can increase their firms’ overseas revenue by 4.0%. As the mean level of overseas 
revenue is about 10%, such an increase represents about 40% change, which is economically 
significant. The results using Overseas number and Overseas percentage as independent 
variable are similar in columns 2 and 3. Finally, we show in column 4 that when a CEO has 
overseas experience, the firm’s overseas revenue also increases.   
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of Chinese publicly listed companies, we examine whether and how 
managerial foreign experience affects firm OFDI decisions. We find a significantly positive 
association between managerial foreign experience and corporate OFDI. The relation is stable 
with a series of robustness tests, including alternative measures of foreign experience and 
foreign investment, the instrumental variable method, the PSM approach, and the Heckman 
selection model. Further analyses reveal significant cross-sectional variation of the relation. 
Specifically, compared to state owned enterprises (SOEs), the foreign investment promotion 
effect is larger among private firms (non-SOEs). Returnee managers at senior positions exert a 
more significant impact on firm outward investment than those at junior positions. In addition, 
both foreign work experience and study experience have positive effect on OFDI.  
By documenting the positive impact of managerial foreign experience on corporate OFDI, 
we contribute to the literature on OFDI and the literature on how management knowledge is 
transmitted across countries. Our paper also has its policy implication. In 2013, the Chinese 
government started the “One Belt and One Road” (OBOR) initiative, attempting to further 
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expand its economic integration with other countries in Asia, Europe, and Africa through 
OFDI.8 The initiative is also viewed as a national strategy and a commitment to China’s open 
economy policy. More recently, Chinese government actively promotes OBOR and encourages 
Chinese companies to invest in those counties along the Silk Road. The evidence in our paper 
suggests that recruiting returnee managers into Chinese companies can effectively promote 
OFDI, which complements prior studies’ finding (Luo et al., 2010). 
  
                                                
8 OBOR refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. 
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Figure 1: The percentage of firms initiating OFDI with or without returnee managers 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Variable name Variable definition 
Foreign direct investment  
OFDI (0/1) 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if there is at least one OFDI in the year, and 
0 otherwise. 
OFDI amount Natural logarithm of 1 plus total OFDI amount in RMB in the year. 
Overseas revenue Overseas revenue divided by total revenue. 
Managerial foreign experience 
Overseas dummy 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has any executive with 
overseas experience, and 0 otherwise.  
Overseas number Total number of executives having overseas experience. 
Overseas percentage 
Total number of executives having overseas experience divided by total number 
of executives. 
Overseas CEO 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company CEO has overseas experience, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Overseas work dummy 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has at least one executive with 
overseas working experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Overseas study dummy 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has at least one executive with 
overseas studying experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Overseas senior dummy 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has at least one senior 
executive (CEO or vice CEO) with overseas experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Overseas junior dummy 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the company has at least one junior 
executive (except CEO or vice CEO) with overseas experience, and 0 otherwise. 
Other variables  
Top1 The percentage shares owned by the largest shareholder in year t. 
Independence The number of independent directors divided by total number of directors. 
Managerial ownership The percentage shares owned by executives in year t. 
Firm size Natural logarithm of 1 plus total assets at the end of year.  
Leverage Total liability divided by total assets at the end of year. 
ROA Net income divided by total assets at the end of year. 
Sales growth Sales growth from year t-1 to year t. 
Asset turnover Total revenue divided by total assets at the end of year. 
Firm age The number of years since the firm was incorporated. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
 
Year N 
# of firms with 
returnee managers (%) 
# of firms initiate 
OFDI (%) 
Percentage1 Percentage2 
2001 945 83 (8.78%) 5 (0.53%) 2.41% 0.35% 
2002 1,025 93 (9.07%) 3 (0.29%) 1.08% 0.21% 
2003 1,092 116 (10.62%) 3 (0.27%) 0.86% 0.20% 
2004 1,159 134 (11.56%) 6 (0.52%) 0.75% 0.49% 
2005 1,231 159 (12.92%) 6 (0.49%) 1.26% 0.37% 
2006 1,222 157 (12.85%) 9 (0.74%) 0.64% 0.75% 
2007 1,162 150 (12.91%) 10 (0.86%) 2.00% 0.69% 
2008 1,255 173 (13.78%) 20 (1.59%) 4.05% 1.20% 
2009 1,347 185 (13.73%) 26 (1.93%) 3.24% 1.72% 
2010 1,498 235 (15.69%) 31 (2.07%) 3.83% 1.74% 
2011 1,893 298 (15.74%) 42 (2.22%) 2.68% 2.13% 
2012 2,279 421 (18.47%) 52 (2.28%) 2.85% 2.15% 
2013 2,328 448 (19.24%) 38 (1.63%) 1.56% 1.65% 
2014 2,307 472 (20.46%) 87 (3.77%) 5.08% 3.43% 
2015 2,403 468 (19.48%) 153 (6.37%) 9.19% 5.68% 
Total 23,146 3,592(15.52%) 491(2.12%) 3.54% 1.86% 
 
Note: Percentage1 represents the ratio of firms initiating OFDI with returnee managers, while Percentage2 
represents the ratio of firms initiating OFDI without returnee managers. 
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Panel B: Sample distribution by industry 
Industry N 
# of firms with  
returnee managers  
(%) 
# of firms  
initiating OFDI 
(%) 
Agriculture 445 43 (9.66%) 5 (1.12%) 
Mining 471 59 (12.53%) 34 (7.22%) 
Manufacturing 14,542 2,355 (16.19%) 275 (1.89%) 
Electronic and gas 877 63 (7.18%) 32 (3.65%) 
Construction 499 69 (13.83%) 50 (10.02%) 
Wholesale and retail 1,561 183 (11.72%) 20 (1.28%) 
Transportation 826 119 (14.41%) 16 (1.94%) 
Accommodation and catering 129 19 (14.73%) 3 (2.33%) 
Information and technology 994 289 (29.07%) 13 (1.31%) 
Real estate 1,315 168 (12.78%) 21 (1.60%) 
Leasing and business services 256 34 (13.28%) 3 (1.17%) 
Scientific research and  
  technical services 
68 18 (26.47%) 1 (1.47%) 
Public Facilities Management 203 14 (6.90%) 1 (0.49%) 
Residents services 63 10 (15.87%) 1 (1.59%) 
Education 4 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Health and social work 18 8 (44.44%) 2 (11.11%) 
Culture, sports and entertainment  154 34 (22.08%) 7 (4.55%) 
Comprehensive 721 107 (14.84%) 7 (0.97%) 
Total 23,146 3,592 (15.52%) 491 (13.67%) 
 
Note: Industry classification is based on the 2012 Chinese Security Regulation Commission (CSRC) industry 
classification. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Std P25 Median P75 
Variables of OFDI 
OFDI (0/1) 23,146 0.025  0.155  0.000  0.000  0.000  
OFDI amount 23,146 0.515  3.264  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas revenue 23,146 0.100  0.190  0.000  0.000  0.112  
Variable of managers’ foreign experience 
Overseas dummy 23,146 0.155  0.362  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas number 23,146 0.217  0.609  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas percentage 23,146 0.035  0.104  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas CEO 23,146 0.049  0.215  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas work dummy 23,146 0.065  0.247  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas study dummy 23,146 0.132  0.339  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas senior dummy 23,146 0.131  0.337  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Overseas junior dummy 23,146 0.036  0.187  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Control variables 
Top1 23,146 0.370  0.159  0.244  0.347  0.488  
Independence 23,146 0.346  0.087  0.333  0.333  0.375  
Managerial ownership 23,146 0.073  0.200  0.000  0.000  0.006  
Firm size 23,146 21.629  1.228  20.795  21.487  22.287  
Leverage 23,146 0.201  0.161  0.060  0.186  0.310  
ROA 23,146 0.029  0.068  0.011  0.032  0.059  
Sales growth 23,146 0.215  0.608  -0.031  0.119  0.300  
Asset turnover 23,146 0.637  0.465  0.327  0.523  0.798  
Firm age 23,146 12.743  5.375  9.000  12.000  16.000  
 
Note: We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% tails. 
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Panel B: Correlation matrices 
 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) OFDI (0/1) 1 1.00*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.15*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
(2) OFDI amount 0.99*** 1 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.15*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
(3) Overseas dummy 0.05*** 0.05*** 1 1.00*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
(4) Overseas number 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.83*** 1 -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
(5) Top1 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.01 1 -0.07*** -0.20*** 0.17*** 0.02* 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.09*** -0.27*** 
(6) Independence 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** -0.09*** 1 0.07*** 0.11*** -0.07*** 0.02*** -0.02* 0.02* 0.20*** 
(7) Managerial ownership 0.01 0.00 0.06*** 0.04*** -0.09*** 0.13*** 1 -0.03*** -0.17*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.07*** 
(8) Firm size 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.11*** 1 0.23*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.22*** 
(9) Leverage 0.00 0.01 -0.04*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.07*** -0.20*** 0.19*** 1 -0.40*** -0.02* -0.07*** 0.03*** 
(10) ROA 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.36*** 1 0.32*** 0.19*** -0.09*** 
(11) Growth 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.01 0.04*** 0.00 0.02** 0.03*** -0.02** 0.19*** 1 0.17*** -0.15*** 
(12) Asset turnover 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.04*** -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.08*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 1 -0.02*** 
(13) Firm age 0.03*** 0.03*** -0.01 0.01 -0.27*** 0.25*** -0.12*** 0.19*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** 0.01 1 
 
Note: The left below triangle represents Pearson correlations and the right upper triangle represents Spearman correlations. ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10, respectively.
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Panel C: Univariate test 
 

Oversea dummy=1  Overseas dummy=0 Mean 
N Mean N Mean Difference 
OFDI (0/1) 3,592 0.043 19,554 0.021 0.022*** 
OFDI amount 3,592 0.902 19,554 0.444 0.458*** 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 3: The relation between managers’ foreign experience and firm’s OFDI 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.012***  0.255**  
 (2.71)  (2.57)  
Overseas number i,t-1  0.006**  0.131** 
  (2.14)  (2.06) 
Top1 i,t-1 0.017 0.016 0.423* 0.410 
 (1.47) (1.41) (1.66) (1.60) 
Independence i,t-1 0.106*** 0.107*** 2.303*** 2.324*** 
 (3.08) (3.10) (2.96) (2.98) 
Managerial ownership i,t-1 0.004 0.004 0.047 0.051 
 (0.64) (0.67) (0.38) (0.41) 
Firm size i,t-1 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 
 (8.49) (8.45) (8.28) (8.24) 
Leverage i,t-1 -0.017 -0.017 -0.386* -0.393* 
 (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.70) (-1.73) 
ROA i,t-1 -0.019 -0.018 -0.582 -0.580 
 (-1.01) (-1.00) (-1.44) (-1.44) 
Growth i,t-1 0.005** 0.005** 0.095** 0.096** 
 (2.29) (2.31) (2.25) (2.27) 
Asset turnover i,t-1 0.006 0.006 0.141 0.139 
 (1.33) (1.31) (1.39) (1.37) 
Firm age i,t-1 -0.001* -0.001* -0.014 -0.014* 
 (-1.66) (-1.72) (-1.63) (-1.69) 
Constant -0.518*** -0.517*** -11.562*** -11.526*** 
 (-8.07) (-8.02) (-7.91) (-7.86) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,146 23,146 
R2 5.79% 5.76% 6.22% 6.20% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 4: Alternative sampling, measures, and model specification 
Panel A: Removing managers with Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan experience 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.018***  0.366***  
 (3.45)  (3.28)  
Overseas number i,t-1  0.009**  0.182** 
  (2.52)  (2.43) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,146 23,146 
R2 5.85% 5.79% 6.26% 6.23% 
 
Panel B: Alternative measures of managers’ foreign experience 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas percentage i,t-1 0.029**  0.598**  
 (2.18)  (2.08)  
Overseas CEO i,t-1  0.013*  0.261* 
  (1.86)  (1.76) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,146 23,146 
R2 5.74% 5.74% 6.18% 6.17% 
 
Panel C: Alternative model specification 
 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
 Logit Tobit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.388***  7.038***  
 (2.82)  (2.92)  
Overseas number i,t-1  0.103*  2.399** 
  (1.73)  (2.12) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,142 23,142 23,146 23,146 
R2 20.89% 20.72% 11.33% 11.26% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 5: Using instrument variable (IV) approach 
 
Panel A: First stage 
Overseas 
dummy i,t Panel B: Second stage 
OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
(1) (1) (2) 
Mean overseas i,t-1 0.905*** 
Instrumented overseas 
Dummy i,t-1 
0.120** 2.141* 
 (4.06)  (2.04) (1.75) 
Policy i,t-1 0.130*** Top1 i,t-1 0.027*** 0.596*** 
 (2.66)  (2.92) (3.09) 
Top1 i,t-1 -0.441*** Independence i,t-1 0.095*** 2.122*** 
 (-6.21)  (4.93) (5.30) 
Independence i,t-1 0.479*** Managerial ownership i,t-1 0.005 0.064 
 (2.74)  (0.79) (0.52) 
Managerial ownership i,t-1 0.099** Firm size i,t-1 0.022*** 0.493*** 
 (1.96)  (10.69) (11.72) 
Firm size i,t-1 0.121*** Leverage i,t-1 -0.016** -0.380** 
 (12.15)  (-1.99) (-2.29) 
Leverage i,t-1 -0.149* ROA i,t-1 -0.032* -0.832** 
 (-1.94)  (-1.81) (-2.23) 
ROA i,t-1 0.589*** Growth i,t-1 0.004** 0.085** 
 (3.29)  (2.24) (2.29) 
Growth i,t-1 0.019 Asset turnover i,t-1 0.007** 0.151*** 
 (1.13)  (2.49) (2.71) 
Asset turnover i,t-1 -0.058** Firm age i,t-1 0.007** 0.001 
 (-2.29)  (2.49) (0.08) 
Firm age i,t-1 -0.018***    
 (-7.56)    
Constant -3.492*** Constant -0.508*** -11.451*** 
 (-14.17)  (-16.04) (-17.36) 
Year and industry FEs Yes Year and industry FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 23,131 Observations 23,131 23,131 
Adjusted R2 3.75% Adjusted R2 4.82% 5.32% 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
  
41 
 
Table 6: Using propensity score matching (PSM) approach 
Panel A: Covariate balance check 
 
Means 
P values Firms having returnee 
managers 
Matched firms having no 
returnee managers 
State control i,t-1 0.171 0.170 0.926 
Top1 i,t-1 0.361 0.366 0.205 
Board size i,t-1 9.062 9.034 0.553 
Board independence i,t-1 0.358 0.357 0.486 
Firm age i,t-1 12.61 12.524 0.494 
Size i,t-1-1 21.825 21.829 0.903 
Leverage i,t-1 0.185 0.186 0.782 
ROA i,t-1 0.038 0.036 0.364 
MB i,t-1 4.100 4.123 0.810 
Sales growth i,t-1 0.237 0.235 0.890 
Mean overseas 0.249 0.249 0.863 
Policy 0.945 0.945 0.918 
 
Panel B: Regression results using PSM sample 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.015**  0.308**  
 (2.57)  (2.46)  
Overseas number i,t-1  0.005  0.112 
  (1.39)  (1.38) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,572 7,572 7,572 7,572 
R2 8.30% 8.21% 8.93% 8.85% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 7: Using Heckman two-stage selection model 
 
Panel A: First stage 
Overseas 
dummy i,t Panel B: Second stage 
OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
(1) (1) (2) 
State control i,t-1 -0.192*** Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.012** 0.244** 
 (-3.21)  (2.55) (2.45) 
Top1 i,t-1 -0.384** Top1 i,t-1 0.037*** 0.790*** 
 (-2.34)  (3.04) (3.00) 
Board size i,t-1 0.011 Independence i,t-1 0.083** 1.893** 
 (0.75)  (2.37) (2.36) 
Board independence i,t-1 0.610* Managerial ownership i,t-1 0.003 0.039 
 (1.88)  (0.55) (0.31) 
Firm age i,t-1 -0.020*** Firm size i,t-1 0.020*** 0.458*** 
 (-3.52)  (5.27) (5.32) 
Firm size i,t-1 0.140*** Leverage i,t-1 -0.011 -0.288 
 (5.63)  (-0.97) (-1.16) 
Leverage i,t-1 -0.193 ROA i,t-1 -0.043** -1.033** 
 (-1.25)  (-2.25) (-2.50) 
ROA i,t-1 0.470 Growth i,t-1 0.003* 0.073* 
 (1.56)  (1.66) (1.65) 
MB i,t-1 0.017*** Asset turnover i,t-1 0.006 0.149 
 (3.79)  (1.39) (1.44) 
Growth i,t-1 0.015 Firm age i,t-1 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.90)  (0.14) (-0.08) 
Mean overseas i,t-1 0.926*** Inverse Mills Ratio 0.106** 1.925* 
 (3.51)  (2.15) (1.79) 
Constant -4.038*** Constant -0.474*** -10.781*** 
 (-7.10)  (-6.68) (-6.60) 
Year and industry FEs Yes Year and industry FEs Yes Yes 
Observations 22,874 Observations 22,877 22,877 
Pseudo R² 4.00% R2 5.89% 6.30% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 8: Further exploratory tests  
Panel A: The effect of state ownership 
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
 SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.005 0.014*** 0.082 0.286*** 
 (0.36) (3.05) (0.24) (3.09) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,283 17,698 5,283 17,698 
R2 17.65% 3.79% 18.67% 3.86% 
 
Panel B: The effect of managerial position  
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas senior dummy i,t-1 0.011**  0.225**  
 (2.21)  (2.11)  
Overseas junior dummy i,t-1  0.014  0.288 
  (1.42)  (1.40) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,146 23,146 
R2 5.76% 5.73% 6.20% 6.17% 
 
Panel C: Overseas work experience vs. study experience  
  OFDI (0/1) i,t OFDI amount i,t 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas work dummy i,t-1 0.573***  0.302**  
 (3.46)  (2.36)  
Overseas study dummy i,t-1  0.286*  0.218** 
  (1.91)  (1.97) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,146 23,146 
R2 5.76% 5.75% 6.19% 6.19% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively 
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Table 9: The effect of managerial foreign experience on overseas revenue 
 
 Overseas revenue i,t 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Overseas dummy i,t-1 0.041***    
	 (4.60)    
Overseas number i,t-1  0.034***   
	  (5.29)   
Overseas percentage i,t-1   0.197***  
   (4.81)  
Overseas CEO i,t-1    0.070*** 
    (4.07) 
Control variables	 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year and industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 23,146 23,146 23,137 23,146 
R2 10.46% 11.05% 11.04% 10.50% 
 
Note: ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. 
